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 Introduction 
This paper uses a modern statistical technique to analyze a historical situation, the mid-twentieth 
century American steel industry.  The application of modern statistical analysis to this situation is 
interesting for three reasons.   First the seller side of the steel market was so concentrated that perfect 
competition was unlikely; thus, ascertaining the exact nature of the firm behavior would provide insight 
into the operation of oligopoly markets.  Second, there were some institutional changes during this period.  
Certain antitrust cases targeted firm practices and mergers (Rogers, 2009).  In addition, other regulatory 
and political changes may have had significant impacts on the steel industry.  With this sample, one has 
an opportunity to test hypotheses on how regulatory changes affected firm behavior.  Third, since the data 
needed to use modern statistical analysis are limited, it is important to see whether a modern statistical 
technique such as the BLP method can be used in this situation.  (See Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes, 1995; 
Berry, 1994.)   Thus, this exercise gives an idea of the ability of modern techniques to analyze historical 
situations, some of which may have a bearing on modern corporate and government policy.   
  
The steel industry during this 52 year sample period had three characteristics that make a statistical 
analysis not only interesting but also feasible.  First, it was very concentrated on the seller side with fairly 
high entry barriers.  Thus, competitive behavior is unlikely, and therefore, it is important to see how close 
to the competitive outcome the industry came.  Second, in this period the demand composition and seller 
structure of the industry were relatively stable in that the major producers and users did not change that 
much.  Therefore, there may be enough similar observations to use a statistical model.  Third, while much 
steel data are available, it is not anywhere near as much as is found in the markets where modern statistical 
analysis has recently been applied such as the cereals, airline, and beer industries.  (See Nevo, 2000; Nevo, 
2001; Nevo 2003; Berry, Carnall & Spillar, 2006; Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes, 2004; Dubé, Fox & Su, 
2012; Rojas, 2008; Hendel & Nevo, 2006.)   Thus, this situation may be a good test of the ability of modern 
analysis to depict historical situations.  
  
Furthermore, much empirical research has been done on the steel industry in this period, and it is 
important to see how the conclusions of a BLP analysis compare with this work.   This exercise, then, can 
show us whether modern techniques can support or refute the earlier work.  Therefore, in this paper I focus 
on determining the behavior of the firms in the steel industry during this period.  
 
To accomplish this goal, I first describe the salient characteristics of the mid-twentieth century 
steel industry and discuss certain plausible theories of steel firm pricing.  Second, a theoretical model of 
steel industry seller behavior is developed.  Then, I outline an empirical model of the steel market starting 
with first a BLP firm demand equation and then its price equation.  The latter is used to test the various 
theories of market behavior.   After that, the statistical result are described and analyzed.  Finally, in the 
last section, some conclusions are drawn on the estimation results, and the ability of the BLP model to 
depict the steel industry of this period is discussed. 
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Steel Industry 1920-1972 
Certain characteristics of the mid twentieth century American steel industry make it amenable to 
this paper’s statistical analysis.  First, the seller side of the market was so concentrated that the sellers 
could keep the price above the competitive level.  Second in this 50-odd year period, the steel industry 
was quite stable; consequently there are enough similar observations of behavior to use statistical analysis.  
Even with this stability, there was still variation enough to test different hypotheses about changing firm 
behavior.  Here, certain aspects of the industry are discussed to show why our statistical model can be 
feasible and useful.  These aspects are the varying demand conditions, the industry’s changing legal and 
political environment, and the changing market share distribution among sellers.  Last, some hypotheses 
on firm behavior are discussed.  From this discussion I can determine whether the model can be used to 
depict firm behavior and the impact of these government initiatives.   
  
Here I describe the conditions in the steel market that impact on the feasibility of statistical 
analysis, starting with changes in industry demand.  As seen in Table 1, the overall demand level varied 
widely.  The nature of the buyers, however, did not change significantly.  This makes the industry 
especially amenable to statistical analysis.  Overall, the 1920s were a time of growth and prosperity with 
total steel production rising from 47,190,000 to 63,210,000 tons.  In contrast, the 1930s were a time of 
lower demand with total production varying between 15,323,000 in 1932 and 56,637,000 tons in 1937.   
This situation was a result of depressed conditions in the economy.  In the 1940s, World War II 
precipitated a great increase in demand (from 52,799,000 tons in 1939 to 89,641,600 tons in 1944).  In the 
late 1940s, however, an increase in civilian demand more than made up for the drop in military spending 
at the end of the war with production reaching 96,836,000 tons by 1950.  For the remainder of the period, 
steel demand continued to grow, however, with setbacks in 1954, 1958, and 1962 due to recessions.  
Output reached 117,036,000 tons in 1955, 131,462,000 tons in 1965, and 138,747,000 tons in 1972.  Thus, 
this period, 1920 to 1972, was a period of rising steel demand. 
 
With the growing demand, there was some variation in buyer composition, but with two 
exceptions, the major users remained the same over the whole period.  The first exception was the railroad 
industry which dropped from 23 per cent of steel demand in 1926 to just over 4 per cent in 1965.  Not 
only did the proportion of demand accounted for by railroads decline but also its absolute tonnage.  
 
The other exception to the demand stability pattern was the temporary change in product 
composition during World War II (1941 to 1945).  In that period, two uses increased notably: shipbuilding 
and airplanes.  The former’s use of steel rose from 517,771 tons in 1939 (1.3 percent of the total use) to 
over 12,000,000 ton in 1944.  After the war, shipbuilding demand dropped off -- falling to 400,000 tons 
in 1950.   The other major change wrought by the war was the increase in airplane production, but the 
available statistics do not reveal the airplane steel production share.  Hiding this change is that fact that 
much of the airplane steel was subsumed in the automobile statistics.  Among the largest makers of 
airplanes and airplane engines during the war were General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler.  In the automobile 
industry, the manufacture of passenger cars was essentially abolished, but the fabrication of defense 
vehicles such as tanks, self-propelled guns, trucks, and, of course, airplanes increased more than enough 
to take up the slack.  As stated above, after the war civilian production not only recovered but increased 
significantly.  Consequently, even with the fall in railroad demand and the changes in the early 1940s due 
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 to World War II, the composition of steel in the United States was relatively stable during the five decades 
of the sample.  
  
As shown in Table 1, the major users of steel, automobiles and construction increased, both 
proportionately and absolutely, during the sample period.  Other large users of steel, machinery and 
containers, also maintained or increased their market share.  Thus, the composition of demand in steel was 
relatively stable during this period except for the decline in railroad usage. 
 
Before discussing the market share distribution, it is important to appreciate the legal and political 
environment of the American steel industry.  The former was mainly determined by the antitrust laws, 
while the latter arose from a feeling that steel pricing accounted for the inflation present in the U.S. 
economy in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.  Thus, these situations led to a number of government policies 
that could have affected the price and quantity outcomes in the steel industry.   
 
At the start of this period, the Justice Department lost the antitrust case intended to break up U.S. 
Steel (U. S. 417, 1920; Comanor & Scherer, 1995).  U.S. Steel was left intact.   This situation likely 
influenced U.S. Steel behavior.  There was always a fear on the part of the company that the government 
would bring back the case.  Some claim that these fears brought about a de-emphasis on technological 
change.  While this is not certain, the fear may have led the company to other strategies, such as the 
optimal yielding of market posited by Stigler (1965) and Gaskins (1972).   
 
Antitrust laws also constrained other steel companies.  In the 1920s, the Federal Trade Commission 
prevented a group of Pennsylvania firms from buying Youngstown Sheet & Tube, and in the 1950s, the 
Justice Department prevented Bethlehem Steel from buying the same firm.  Other anti-merger cases were 
not so successful.  In 1935, the Justice Department failed to stop Republic Steel from buying Corrigan, 
McKinney and Company, a large Cleveland steel maker. 
  
Possibly, the antitrust cases most relevant to industry behavior were those against basing point 
pricing in 1924 and 1948.  The former case proscribed the Pittsburgh Plus basing point pricing system 
where there was one basing point, Pittsburgh.  The 1948 case banned basing point pricing from any point.  
Such systems could very well help companies charge higher prices.  Basing point pricing was the practice 
whereby companies charged transportation costs on the assumption that the point of origin was the basing 
point not the location of the actual originating plant.  For instance, a plant located in Lorain, Ohio would 
charge the customer in Cleveland, the transportation cost from Pittsburgh instead of Lorain.  Until 1924, 
all firms used Pittsburgh as the basing point; between 1924 and 1948, they used a number of other points 
such as Chicago, Illinois, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and Middletown, Ohio.  This practice was possibly a 
way for firms to coordinate on prices (Carlton, 1983).  In 1948, however, the system was abolished. 
  
Other government initiatives potentially affecting the steel market outcomes include the National 
Recovery Administration in the 1930s whereby the government encouraged companies to cooperate in 
setting prices to counteract the Great Depression.   However, this program did not last long -- being 
declared unconstitutional in the 1935.  
 
During World War II and the Korean War, the government imposed price controls on steel product 
(and on most products in the economy).  While these controls probably discouraged capacity additions, 
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 their impacts on pricing may have been attenuated by certain institutional constraints peculiar to the steel 
industry (Rogers, 2009).  
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the government often saw the steel industry as a source of price inflation.  
This led to pressure on pricing decisions by the federal government -- most notably by the Kennedy 
administration in 1963 -- when U.S. Steel rescinded a price increase ostensibly at the behest of the 
President.  Sources at the time, however, thought that the rescission would have happened anyway 
(McConnell, 1963).  This paper tests the hypotheses of the sources. 
 
Another constraint on American steel company pricing was the growth of imports in the 1960s.   
A steel strike in 1959 led to buyers successfully searching abroad for suitable steel.  This resulted in a 
great increase in steel imports in the 1960s and subsequent decades outside the sample.  This situation 
may have led to pricing policy changes.  As described below, the model can test the hypotheses that these 
events changed behavior (Mancke, 1968; Rippe, 1970). 
  
To use the BLP model to test these theories on market outcome and firm behavior, one needs data 
and information on the market share of the sellers in the industry.  Table 2 shows the market share of the 
eight largest steel firms and the competitive fringe including imports.  Before analyzing the changes in 
market share, I now discuss the peculiar nature of these data.  The universe from which these market 
shares are drawn includes not only the sales by American steel firms and foreign exporters to the American 
market but also an estimate of the total use of steel by the American economy not replaced by new metal 
production.  This statistic is used in the BLP model; as shown below such an estimate can be made from 
information on the total steel present in the economy and its deterioration as indicated by the depreciation 
rates.  It makes sense to use it throughout this paper.  (How it is calculated is explained in section 5a.)  
The major changes in market share (whatever its particular basis) are the drop in U.S. Steel market share 
and the increase in the share of some of the smaller steel firms such as Bethlehem Steel, National Steel, 
Armco, and Inland Steel.   
 
Importantly, the same firms were prominent in the 1960s as were in the 1920s.  For much of the 
period, the same type of people (and sometimes even the same people) ran most of the companies; Eugene 
Grace ran Bethlehem Steel for four decades, and members of the Verrity and Block families were key 
executives in Armco and Inland Steel respectively throughout the period.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that the management style and other behavior patterns of the steel firms did not materially change over 
the period. 
 
The change in market share over time points to some interesting hypotheses.  The fall in U.S. Steel 
market share may have meant that at some point U.S. Steel had lost its dominance.  Certain findings and 
theories support these ideas.  Stigler (1965) and Parsons and Ray (1975) essentially assert that U.S. Steel 
consciously yielded its market share in a way that maximized profits.  They posit that U.S. Steel did this 
by raising their price and yielding market share over a long period of time.  Both papers make plausible 
statistical cases for their hypotheses.  Gaskins (1971) develops a theory whereby large dominant firms 
shed market share in a dynamic profit maximizing strategy.  (In some situations a firm’s best policy might 
be to retain its market share.  One of these conditions would be that the firm was a low cost producer.  
This was certainly not true of U.S. Steel.)  Essentially, Gaskins posits that a dominant firm maximizes a 
stream of income over a period consisting of multiple observations.  These theories are consistent with 
the hypothesis that at some point U.S. Steel changed its strategy from that of a Stackelberg leader to Nash-
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 Bertrand, the behavior hypothesized for non-dominant firms in small numbers markets.   
 
In the 1960s, rising imports and possible interference in pricing by the Kennedy administration 
may have led to more competitive behavior by U.S. Steel (Mancke, 1968; Rippe, 1970; McConnell, 1963).   
In section 3 below, the major hypotheses on U.S. Steel and the other firm behavior are summarized. 
 
To sum up, the nature of the mid-20th century steel industry suggests two sets of hypotheses that 
may be tested using a modern statistical model.  The first set posits that changes in economic conditions 
such as the Depression, the growth of imports in 1960s, and changes in market share distribution could 
have altered U.S. Steel’s behavior.  The second set asserts that government policy changes such as the 




A Model of Industry Behavior 
To model this industry, I assume m profit maximizing firms with each firm j producing a different 
product.  The assumption of differentiated products with each steel company using price as the decision 
variable may seem counter-intuitive to some familiar with the industry.  In the past, steel industry models 
have assumed homogenous products with quantity as the decision variable (Rogers, 1989).  For steel, 
however, each firm producing a different product is a reasonable assumption.  First, there are many types 
of steel, and different firms produce different product mixes.  Certain companies and plants specialize in 
given different steel products.  For instance, the National Steel plant at Weirton, West Virginia made 
mainly tin-plate for tin cans, while the Inland Steel plant in East Chicago, Indiana made a combination of 
construction products for the Chicago market and automobile sheet steel.   Second, transportation costs 
are important in the industry; customers essentially view firms at different locations, even those producing 
the same type of steel, as producing what are essentially different products.  Because of transportation 
costs, they will likely (but not always) pay different prices for the same kind of steel.  For more on how 
location matters to customers, see Karlson (1983).  In the long run, firms can change their location by 
building new plants, but for short run decision-making the plants and their firm output are almost immobile 
geographically.  Consequently, the location of the company and its plants needs to be accounted for in the 
model.   
 
My model, thus, follows Nevo (2001) by assuming m firms with each producing a different product 
mix with the below profit function and with price as the decision variable: 
 
[(pjt – TVCjt) Mt Sjt] – TFCjt,   j= 1, m firms.      (1) 
  
Here, pjt is the price of steel for firm j in year t; TVCjt is the total variable cost for firm j in year t; Sjt is the 
market share for firm j in year t; Mt equals the total use of steel in the United States in year t, and TFCjt is 
the total fixed cost for firm j in year t.  To obtain the information (in the form of parameters) necessary to 
compute this function, I will estimate the demand side of the industry, but first a data problem has to be 
addressed. 
 
For my data set only one steel price statistic is available for each year.  The yearly data points, 
then, are averages of the prices for sets of different steel products.  Therefore, I set up a model where the 
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 industry has only one price (pt).  While the one-price assumption is a necessary distortion given the 
available data, it may not be serious.  To see why, consider the composition of the yearly price datum.  It 
is essentially a weighted average of a large number of particular steel product prices, since there are many 
types of steel products.  Since each steel firm produces a number of different products, its average price 
would be a similar weighted average of steel product prices.  The ideal situation would be to have such an 
average for the products sold by each firm.  Since these averages are not available, one must consider an 
average of the products of the whole industry.  There are many types of steel, but in costs they are similar.  
Thus, it is very likely that this industry index would be highly correlated with the indices for each of the 
firms (if they existed).  Consequently, there may not be a too great distortion when the industry index is 
used rather than the company indices (which do not exist). 
 
Whatever the price data set used, this paper starts with the assumption of Nash-Bertrand (called 
below Nash-B) behavior on the part of all the steel firms including U.S. Steel (Nevo, 2000; Nevo, 2001).  
The Nash-Bertrand assumption is that firms do not react strategically to competitor firm actions; thus, 
each firm assumes that others do not change prices or quantities in reaction to its actions.  Given the above 
firm model, equation (1), profit maximization, and the Nash-Bertrand assumption, the firm first order 
conditions are 
 
Sjt(pt) + [pt – MCjt]  Sj(pt)/ pt,  = 0,  j= 1, m firms.                                               (2)  
  
Here, pt equals the industry price average discussed above; MCjt is the Marginal Cost of firm j, and  
 Sj(pt)/ pt, is the derivative of firm j market share with respect to its price.  Essentially, in this model, 
each firm regards its competitor’s output as fixed.  From the Nash-Bertrand model, this price equation 
follows: 
 
pt = - Sjt(pt)/[ Sj(p)/ pt]+ MCj.         
 
From these conditions, I arrived at this equation for marginal cost, 
 
 pt  + Sjt(pt)/[ Sjt(p)/ pt]  = MCjt.       (2a) 
 
(This function looks strange given the positive sign of the second term, but since [ Sjt(p)/ pt]  is 
negative it is consistent with marginal cost being less than price.) 
 
Another supply side behavioral approach seems plausible for the steel industry, the Stackelberg 
leadership model on the part of the largest firm, U.S. Steel.  Given this firm’s much higher market share, 
it is conceivable that it followed a behavior pattern other than Nash-B.  A most plausible alternative model 
for U.S. Steel is Stackelberg behavior whereby the leader firm in making its pricing decisions anticipates 
the reactions of the other firms in the industry.  Here the first order conditions result in the following 
markup for the Stackelberg leader, in this case U.S. Steel: 
  
pt – MCL   = - SLt /[ SLt/ pt]+  Sfj {[ Sfj/ pt]/[ SL/ pt][ Sfjt/ pt]},   (3) 
 
where L equals the leader firm and fj = 2, 9, follower firm numbers 2 to m.  The follower firms would act 
in the Nash-Bertrand manner assuming the other firm prices and quantities are not affected by their (the 
follower firm’s) actions.  The follower firms have the below margins: 
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pt – MCfj   = - Sfj /[ sfj/ pfj], fj = 2, m, follower firm numbers 2 to m.              (3a) 
 
Counting as firms, the competitive fringe and the other seven major steel firms leaves eight small firm 
observations in most years.  Models now can be estimated to determine the differences in outcomes 
between the two regimes.  
 
 This paper, thus, uses the above models to test several hypotheses about the behavior of the largest 
firm, U.S. Steel.  The first is that U.S. Steel, acted as a Nash-Bertrand competitor throughout the period.  
Thus, equations 2 and 2a would apply to U.S. Steel for all observations.  The second hypothesis is that 
this firm operated as a Stackelberg leader throughout the period with the other firms acting as Nash-B 
followers.  Equation 3 would apply for all U.S. Steel observations, and 3a would apply to the other firms 
in the industry.   
 
The discussion of the changes in market shares and the political and legal environment of the steel 
industry suggest several other theories on how and when U.S. Steel behavior changed during this period.  
These hypotheses posit that U.S. Steel changed from a Stackelberg leader to a Nash-Bertrand actor at 
some point.  First U.S. Steel did not expand as fast as the rest of the industry thereby losing market share.  
This suggests that at some point the optimal U.S. Steel strategy changed from Stackelberg leadership to 
Nash-Bertrand behavior.  The actual point where the change from one strategy to another would be optimal 
may be determined by first the demand and cost conditions facing the firms and second by the legal and 
political environment of the industry.   
 
As discussed above, theories on U.S. Steel behavior related to market share are suggested by 
Stigler (1965), Parsons and Ray (1975), and Gaskins (1972).  These theories are consistent with the 
hypothesis that U.S. Steel shifted from Stackelberg to Nash-Bertrand in the 1930s when the industry was 
in a depression.  Essentially, U.S. Steel had lost so much market share that it could no longer sustain itself 
as a Stackelberg leader.  Thus, one variant of this theory is that the firm returned to Stackelberg behavior 
in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, when the industry was again prosperous.  Another hypothesis is that U.S. 
Steel permanently switched from Stackelberg to Nash-Bertrand in 1931. 
 
Some scholars posit that changes in the legal and political environment led to changes in U.S. Steel 
behavior.  One theory suggests that the abolition of the Pittsburgh Plus system moved U.S. Steel from 
Stackelberg to Nash-Bertrand behavior in 1924.  Another theory posits that the elimination of the whole 
Basing Point Pricing system moved the firm away from Stackelberg behavior in 1948 (Carlton, 1983).   
 
The economic and regulatory changes of the 1960s also present testable hypotheses on U. S. Steel 
behavior.  Possibly, the increase in imports beginning in 1959 changed U.S. Steel from Stackelberg to 
Nash-Bertrand behavior (Mancke, 1968; Rippe, 1970).  Another hypothesis is that U.S. Steel made the 
switch in 1963 after President John F. Kennedy put pressure on its pricing policy (McConnell, 1963). 
 
 Table 3 summarizes these theories and their implication for U.S. Steel behavior.  The exact setups 
for these hypotheses are developed below, when the empirical demand and supply models are explained 
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 Empirical Model 
Buyer Behavior- Demand   
Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), the demand side of the market can be depicted by 
the following formulation.  Assume buyer i derives utility from buying or using a unit of steel firm j’s 
product in year t: 
 
uijt = (yit - pt)  + Xjt  + jt  + ijt.         (4) 
 
Here, uijt is the utility of buyer i from using a unit of firm j’s steel in year t; yit is buyer i’s income in year 
t; pt is the price of steel in year t; Xjt is the vector of firm j’s known product characteristics in year t;  is 
the parameter for the price-income function;  is a vector of parameters depicting the impact of known 
firm j product characteristics on the buyer’s utility; jt depicts the product characteristics not accounted 
for in the model, and ijt is a residual representing the buyer characteristics.   
 
 Additionally, the BLP model includes the steel consumed by users but not purchased from the steel 
companies.  One can think of this statistic as the steel consumed during the period t but not replaced by 
new steel.  It can be viewed as the depreciation of the stock of steel in the economy.  This concept can be 
depicted by this equation, 
 
u0t =(yit)  + i0t.             (4a) 
 
Consumers who choose not to buy new steel products can be viewed as the users of what other modelers 
call the outside good.  Since none of this steel is bought, current price does not impact on the utility of its 
use, and the firm product characteristics do not matter.  How I obtain and develop the data for this part of 
the model is described in section 5a.  Given the extreme value residual distribution and the above utility 
function, the market share of a firm j’s good can be modeled as follows: 
 
Sjt = exp(ujt) /(1 +  exp (ukt)),           (5) 
 
ujt being the right hand side of equation (4).  (See Nevo 2000; Rasmussen 2007; Train 2009.)  The 
numerator represents the utility to buyers of firm or firm group j’s product, while the summation in the 
denominator depicts the strengths of the other firm or firm group products, the one in the denominator 
representing the outside good with u0t being set equal to zero.   
 
 This equation can be estimated by the logit model (Train, 2009), but there are difficulties with its 
application to the mid-20th century steel industry.  In the logit model, the demand elasticity is a direct 
function of price, the higher the price the higher the demand elasticity.  While there is a certain logic to 
this relationship, it may not hold in many product markets.  Implicit in the logit model is the simplified 
view of the goods used by the buyer whereby her desire for a good is totally tied to the cost of obtaining 
it, that is its price, and not idiosyncratic to the nature of the good.  In many preference structures, unpopular 
low priced goods with low market share are attractive only to price-conscious consumers.   
 
 Another problem concerns cross-elasticity.  With the logit model, the cross elasticity depends on 
the market share and the price of the second good.  Again, the heterogeneous nature of the substitution 
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 and complementarities of the good is not taken into account.  Often a given good may have a high cross 
elasticity with a low priced good with a low market share. 
 
There are three solutions to these problems: the Vertical Differentiation model, the Generalized 
Extreme Value (GEV) model, and the Mixed Logit model (Berry, 1994; Train, 2009).  With the first two 
models, the researcher depicts the substitution and complementarity situations in the model using her 
knowledge of the market.  The third method takes into account buyer characteristics; using them to ferret 
out the substitution and complementarity patterns. 
 
Since it is difficult to ascertain the substitution and complementarity patterns, I use the third model.  
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) suggest a variation on this model that seems especially amenable to 
the steel industry.  It is called the BLP model.  (See Berry, 1994; Berry, Carnall & Spillar, 2006; Nevo, 
2003; Nevo, 2001; Rasmusen, 2007.)  The BLP approach starts with equation (4) 
 
uijt =(yit - pt)  + Xjt  + jt + ijt.       (6) 
 
Then, it puts structure on the ijt.  I posit that a vector of buyer attributes affects the utility of buyer i for a 
given firm’s product.  However, I do not have good data on these attributes.  Therefore, I add vectors of 
random variables, vjit, to account for these unknown buyer characteristics.  Following Berry, Levinsohn, 
and Pakes (1995), I assume that these buyer attributes can be depicted by variables the individual 
observations of which are drawn from a normal distribution about zero with a two unit 95 percent value 
interval.  These draws reflect the buyer preference differences for given firms, and they partly reflect the 
influence of the firm characteristics on the decision of given buyer i to purchase the firm’s product.  The 
draws are multiplied by the price and a subset of the firm characteristics.  Thus, they influence both i the 
impact of price, pt, and i, the impact of firm product characteristics on the utility of the firm’s product.  
Accounting for buyer attributes, then, results in this equation, 
  
uijt = (yit - pt) i + Xjt i + jt.        (6a) 
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 Here, the parameters, i and i, are different for each individual buyer, being denoted as follows: 
 
 i = [0 + p  vipt], and 
 
i = [0  + k  vijt]. 
 
Here 0 and 0 are the means of the impacts of Steel Price and the other product characteristic variables, 
while p  and k are parameters that show the difference in the impacts of the product variables on different 
buyers.  The latter are often called the standard deviation variables.  These variables are the products of 
the draws from the normal distribution, vipt and vit, and the firm characteristic variables, (yit-pt) and Xjt  he 
draws depict the differing attributes of buyers.  This leads to the following specification:  
 
uijt = (yit - pt) [0 + p  vipt]+ Xjt [0 + k  vijt] + jt.       (6b) 
 
For estimation’s sake, this expression can be reconfigured as follows: 
 
uijt = ijt + pijt, where 
 
ijt = (yit - pt) 0 + Xjt 0 + jt,   and 
 
ijt = (yit - pt) [ vipt]p+ Xjt [ vijt]k.        (6c) 
 
Here, the second term, pijt, contains the vectors, consisting of the parameters, p and k, along with the 
variables, vipt and vit, representing the distribution of the buyer attributes.  This allows the impacts of firm 
characteristics to vary with different buyers.  Since this equation does not have a closed form, the model 
can only be estimated by a simulation technique.   
 
A second problem is the endogeneity between the steel price and market share; this can be solved 
by the use of instrumental variables for pt.  (The formulation for this instrumental equation is described 
below.)  To show how this equation can be used to test the above discussed hypotheses, I now examine 
the price equation. 
  
Price Equation   
The above formulations of prices (equations 3 and 3a) are now used to estimate price equations 
for this model.  To see how this can be done, I start with this price equation, 
 
pt = MARGjt+ MCjt,  j =1, 9.        (7) 
 
Here MARGj equals the firm j’s markup over marginal cost (MCj) as depicted by equations 2, 2a, 3, and 
3a depending on the type of firm behavior specified.  Estimates based on the parameters of the firm 
demand models are used to compute these margins.  For a Nash-Bertrand firm (or a Stackelberg  
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 follower), the mark up in the price equation is  
 
MARGjt = - Sj /[ Sj/ pj].          (7a) 
 
For the Stackelberg leader, the markup is  
 
MARGjt = - SL /[ SL/ pL]+  Sfj {[ Sfj/ pL]/[ SL/ pL][ Sfj/ pfj]}.  (7b) 
 
To estimate these equations, I first use the parameter results from the demand equation to compute the 
margin (MARGjt), this statistic being calculated from equations 2, 3a, and 3b. 
 
I, then, add some reasonable marginal cost components, including input prices.  The major steel 
production inputs were coal, iron ore, scrap steel, and labor; thus, I use the following prices: for coal, PCt, 
iron ore, PIRt, scrap steel, PSSt, and labor, WAGEt.  To account for economies or diseconomies of scale, the 
firm production quantity, qt, is included in the model.  I also add a Time Counter, TIME, to take into 
account technological and institutional changes.  Therefore, the price-markup equation would be 
 
 pt - MARGj = 0 + 1 qjt +2 TIMEt +3 PCt +4 PIRt + 5 PSSt +6 WAGE t.   (7c) 
     
Given the sample, firm observations over a 53 year period, I have a panel data set.  To account for this 
situation, I use a fixed effect model.  To do this, I add dummy variables first for eight of the nine firms or 
firm groups (FDUMj) and second for four of the five decades in the sample (Decadem).  Time enters this 
model in two ways: the counter-variable which reflects changes in the firm technology, and the decade 
dummies represent changes in the entire market.  The definitions of and data sources for these variables 
are given in Table 4.   
 
Since quantity (qjt) is determined simultaneously with price (pt), an instrumental variable technique 
is used with qjt being the dependent variable in the instrumental variable equation.  The instruments in this 
equation consist of the other independent variables in 7c and some of the exogenous demand variables in 
6b. 
 
To determine the difference between the hypotheses of various theories, I use an encompassing 
test (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1981).  I compare the explanatory power of the equations implied by one 
behavioral theory, say Stackelberg with another theory, Nash-B.  Equation (7c) is estimated under 
different behavior assumptions, and a test is made to see which one has the higher explanatory power.  
This reformulation of the model clarifies the procedure, 
 
pt = 1*MARGjhkt +0 + 1 qjt +2 TIMEt +3 PCt +4 PIRt + 5 PSSt +6 WAGE t, hk=1, 2.             (7d) 
 
Here MARGj1 is the margin under hypothesis 1 (Nash_B, equations 2 and 3b), and MARGj2 is the margin 
under hypothesis 2 (Stackelberg, equation 3).  J tests (described below) are, then, used to determine which 
of these two models has the highest explanatory power. 
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In this section, I first discuss the data set; then, I summarize the estimating model, and last I 
describe the particulars of the estimation technique.  Other than market share, the demand and price model 
data (outlined in Table 4) consist of firm product characteristics, input prices, and the randomly distributed 
variables reflecting buyer attributes.  With the exception of some market shares, the data for these variables 
are available for the entire sample (1920-1972).  The market share data consist of the shares for the eight 
largest firms are often called the “Big Eight”, and that for the industry fringe including imports: the source 
being the American Iron and Steel Institute (1910-1975).  For these variables all the necessary data are 
available except for the market share of National Steel for the years, 1920-1929 and 1938-1945 (see Table 
2).  The fringe of small producers (including imports) is assumed to be another firm, and consequently 
there are nine firms or firm groups for each year except for years when National Steel data are not 
available.  In those years, there are only eight firm observations, National Steel data being aggregated with 
the fringe output.   
 
Another data problem is the outside good.  To find the data for this variable, I posit that the people 
who are not buying steel are still using it.  I assume the stock of steel was depreciated at the rate of 7 per 
cent per year by these people using the metal but not buying any.  This percentage is the average ratio 
between the capital consumption allowance (the macroeconomic measure of depreciation) and GDP for 
the United States between 1947 and 1972.  I have also assumed that the total stock of steel in the United 
States consisted of the entire output produced since 1880 minus the amount resulting from the 
deterioration of seven percent of the stock in each year.  When I varied both the deterioration rate and the 
beginning year, the stock for each year did not change that much.  Very little steel was produced before 
1880, and the resulting stock in any given year was not sensitive to the variation in the depreciation 
between 10 and 1 percent.  (Variations in the depreciation rates do not significantly affect the posited 
consumption level of the outside good and the theoretical amount of steel in the economy.  Higher 
depreciation rates mean that the posited amount of steel available in a year would be smaller; this would 
counteract the positive impact of these higher depreciation rates on the amount of the outside good, the 
estimate of steel being used but not replaced.)  
 
The major product characteristic for which firm data are readily available is location.  Steel has 
relative high transportation costs, and steel plants are not that mobile; thus, often the location of a steel 
plant determines the buyer decision on which company to patronize.  The average location of each firm is 
represented by the weighted averages of the longitudes (FLongj) and latitudes (Flatj) of its plants, the 
weights being plant capacity divided by the total firm capacity for given years (American Iron and Steel 
Institute, 1910-1975).  
 
To portray the characteristics of the firms other than location, a firm dummy variable is used for 
seven of the eight largest firms and the aggregate fringe production.  U. S. Steel is used as the base firm 
without a dummy.  The firm dummy portrays the difference in unaccounted-for product characteristics 
between the firms.   
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 Over time, changes in buyer perceptions led to changes in the utility obtained by buyers from the 
products of given firms.  To depict these changes a time counter, Time, is added to the model.  Many 
unobserved variables affect the outcome of the competitive process in the steel industry, and they are 
depicted by the symbol, jt. 
 
To better appreciate the model, one must further examine the sample.  There are 53 years, each 
with either eight or nine observations representing the eight largest steel companies as well as the 
competitive fringe.  This specification gives us 459 observations, eight or nine for each of the 53 years.  
As stated above, observations are available for all variables except for market share for National Steel in 
some years.  
 
I now depict the buyers as best I can with the available information.  For each of the three firm 
variables, Steel Price, FLongj, and Flatj, I draw 100 random observations from normal distributions with 
a mean of zero and a 95 per cent range from +1 to -1.  Then, I multiply the draws, vipt, vi1t, and vi2t, by the 
three firm demand variables, Steel Price, FLongj and Flatj, for each of the 53 years.  Then, I take a random 




Summary of the Estimating Equations 
 
Here the estimating models for firm market share and price are outlined.  The demand equation 
model can be represented as follow: 
 
Sjt = exp(ujt) /(1 +  exp (ukt)). 
 
Here this equation can be operationalized as follows: 
 
 Sjt / S0t = exp(ujt), 
 
where S0t is the share of the outside good.  (For the derivation of this formula, see Berry 1994; Berry, 
Levinsohn & Pakes, 1995).  This formulation can be converted to the following: 
 
 ln (Sjt / S0t) = ujt 
 
where      ujt = - pt 0 + FLong jt 01 + FLatjt 02 + FDUMBethehem 03 + FDUMRepublic 04  
 
       +FDUMNational 05  + FDUMJones&Laughlin 06 + FDUMArmco  07 + FDUMYoungstown 08   
 
       + FDUMInland 09  + FDUMFringe 10 + Time  11  + jt, 
 




 ujt = jt + pijt, where jt is ijt with the yit cancelled out. 
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For this model, yit cancels out in the market share equation, and the model includes ujt and jt instead of 
ujt and jt.   
 
The price equation depicting firm supply is, then, 
 
pt =1*MARGjhk +0 +1 qjt +2 TIME +3 PCt, +4 PIRt + 5 PSSt, +6 WAGEt,  h=1, 2.  (8b) 
 
Here MARGjhk is calculated from the markup formula for the two hypothesized forms of behavior, Nash-
Bertrand, hk equals 1, and Stackelberg, hk equals 2.  These equations are estimated using the below 
instrumental variable equations for pt on the demand side and qtj for the firm supply side.  
 
pt =0 +1 FLongjt +2 FLatjt  +3 FDUMBethehem +4 FDUMRepublic  +5 FDUMNational  
  
     +6 FDUMJones&Laughlin +7 FDUMArmco +8 FDUMYoungstown + 9 FDUMInland  +10 FDUMFringe   
 
     + 11 Time +12  PCt +13 PIRt +14 PSSt +15 WAGEt  +vtj                                               (8c) 
 
and  
qjt =0 +1 FLong jt +2 FLatjt  +3 FDUMBethehem +4 FDUMRepublic  +5 FDUMNational  
  
     +6 FDUMJones&Laughlin +7 FDUMArmco +8 FDUMYoungstown +9 FDUMInland  +10 FDUMFringe   
 
     +11 Time +12  PCt +13 PIRt +14 PSSt +15 WAGEt  +wtj                                               (8d) 
 
with vtj and wtj being residuals. This formulation is very similar (but not identical) to that of the two Stage 
Least Squares model used to estimate conventional product supply and demand equations.  It is different 
in that the price and quantity reduced form models do not include all firm price and quantity exogenous 




This paper’s first goal is to estimate equations (8a and 8b).  Since equation 8a is not a closed form, 
an iterative estimation procedure has to be used (Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2000; 
Rasmussen, 2007).  One starts this procedure with initial parameter values for ujt and jt.  For the former, 
one can use a logit model to estimate a predicted value for jt.  Since price is endogenous, an instrumental 
variable procedure is required.  In additional to the exogenous demand variables, the prices for the 
following important inputs into steel manufacturing are used as instruments: coal, iron ore, scrap steel, 
and steel labor (shown in equations 8c).  
 
 Given an initial parameter estimates for the predicted value of ijt, a nonlinear search technique 
can be used to estimate the parameters of pijt.  From the first estimates of the pijt parameters, a new value 
for ijt is computed.  New ijt parameters are estimated and used to find new values for the pijt parameters 
by the nonlinear search method.  From there, a new ijt is computed from the new pijt parameters.  The 
procedure is repeated until the change in residual reaches a minimal level which comes close to 
14
The Journal of Economics and Politics, Vol. 23 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://collected.jcu.edu/jep/vol23/iss1/1
 maximizing the likelihood function.  This is called the contraction method (Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes, 
1995). 
 
For the price equation, the above-described instrumental variable estimation model is used because 





The results of the demand model estimation method are shown in Table 5.  The coefficients for 
the mean parameter values and the standard deviations, vp, vlong, and vlat, are all significant, except for the 
mean for latitude (Flatjt) and the standard deviations for steel price (pt) and longitude (FLongjt).  The steel 
price mean has the expected negative sign, and it is highly significant.  The insignificant coefficients are 
included in the model because zero standard deviation coefficients for Steel Price and Longitude are not 
inconsistent with economic theory.  Neither is the insignificant coefficient for the mean of latitude.  
Essentially, it is reasonable that the mean impact of the Flatj could be not significantly different from zero, 
while there is a significant variation in the reactions of different customers to geographic latitude.  The 
significant negative coefficient for FLongj indicates that other things equal the farther east the firms were 
located the greater the demand for their steel.  (As one goes east in North America, longitude numbers 
decrease.)  The significant standard deviation parameters indicate that these effects varied for different 
users.  The positive and significant coefficient for Time, the time counter variable, indicates that over time 
steel demand rose.  The dichotomous variables for the smaller steel firms and the competitive fringe are 
negative and significant.  This likely reflects short run capacity limitations rather than any ingrained buyer 
preference for the products of U.S. Steel. 
 
Price Equation 
Table 6 displays the results of two different versions of the price equation for my model.  One is 
for the sequence where all firms, including U.S. Steel, acted in a Nash-Bertrand fashion, and the other is 
for a sequence of events when U.S. Steel permanently switched from the Stackelberg behavior model to 
Nash-Bertrand in 1931.  (The markup of price over marginal cost is determined by demand parameters 
estimated above and firm behavior.  To calculate the margins (in 8b), one feeds these demand parameters 
into equations 2a, 3, or 3a depending on the hypothesis being tested.)  As discussed below, the latter model 
is one of the two most likely; that is why it is displayed.   
 
The estimated parameter values in these price equations are plausible.  All the input prices have 
positive coefficients, and three are significantly above zero on a one tail test.  In both models, the Time 
counters are above zero, and the quantity variables are not significantly different from zero on a two tail 
test.  The sign could be either negative or positive for either of these variables. 
 
These two equations seem quite plausible as do the equations arising from the other behavioral 
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 Behavioral Hypotheses  
 
 Here, I use the price model results to determine what behavioral pattern best fits the data.   As 
stated above, Table 6 shows estimates of the price equations under two sets of assumptions: (1) Nash-
Bertrand behavior by all firms and (2) the model combining the Stackelberg behavior by U.S. Steel for 
part of the sample (1920-1930) with Nash-B for the rest of the sample and for the whole sample for the 
other firms.  As described below, I test several other hypotheses on the behavior of U.S. Steel.  To do this, 
I use J-tests to compare the explanatory power of different sequences of behavior of U.S. Steel (Davidson 
& MacKinnon, 1981).   To set up a J test, one estimates two models with two different non-encompassing 
sets of variables.  Then, one adds the predicted value of one of the models to the other.  Using the t value 
for coefficient of this expected value variable, one determines whether the second model adds explanatory 
power to the first.  As is shown below, the results can be ambiguous in two situations; first, neither of the 
two models adds to the explanatory power of the other with both t values being insignificant.  Second, 
both t values can be significant implying each model adds to the explanatory power of the other.  The 
most desirable result is that one t or J value is significant while the other is not; this indicates that one 
model unambiguously adds explanatory power to the other. 
 
 Tables 7 and 8 display the test results between pairs of sequences of U.S. Steel and other firm 
behavior patterns.  Table 7 shows a set of J tests comparing the basic Nash-B model whereby all firms 
acted in a Nash-Bertrand manner throughout the sample to several alternative patterns of behavior. 
 
The first comparison in Table 7 is between the two Nash-Bertrand hypotheses: one with a 
competitive fringe setting price equal to marginal cost, and one with the fringe acting like the rest of the 
industry in a Nash-B fashion.  Two J tests are used: one for the hypothesis that the competitive fringe 
model adds to the explanatory power of the Nash-Bertrand fringe model, and one for the assertion that the 
latter fringe model adds to the explanatory power of the first model.  As shown in the table, the tests 
indicate that neither model adds explanatory power to the other.  The t values or J tests are respectively -
0.188 and 0.187. 
 
I now proceed on the assumption that Nash-Bertrand behavior on the part of the fringe is the more 
likely hypothesis.  Theory would predict that the fringe firms, most of whom have some product 
differentiation advantage, would behave as Nash-Bertrand competitors, pricing at a point where they enjoy 
some margin over marginal cost.  Given this reasonable supposition as well as the ambiguous results, I 
proceed on the assumption of the fringe acting in a Nash-Bertrand manner. 
 
 As shown in Table 7, a second set of J tests compares (1) the model with all firms (including U.S. 
Steel and the fringe) acting in a Nash-Bertrand manner with (2) the Stackelberg model with U.S. Steel 
performing as a leader throughout the sample and with the rest following Nash-B strategies.  The J tests 
are both insignificant (on a two tail test) indicating that neither behavioral hypothesis adds to the 
exploratory power of the other.  The statistical results are again inconclusive.   
 
As discussed above, it is likely, however, that U.S. Steel changed its behavior at some point during 
the period.   The literature suggests several hypotheses.  One is that during the depression, 1930-1940, the 
industry became more competitive.  This change could have arisen from several developments in addition 
to the drop in demand brought about by hard times.  (They are discussed in sections 2 and 3, above.)  To 
examine these hypotheses, I set up two sequences for U.S. Steel: one hypothesizes a change from 
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 Stackelberg to Nash-Bertrand in the 1930’s and a reversion to the Stackelberg behavior for the rest of the 
sample.  The other posits that U.S. Steel became a Nash-Bertrand firm in 1931 and remained that way for 
the rest of the sample. 
 
 As shown in Table 7 (comparison 3), the J test results support both the hypothesis that all the firms 
acted in a Nash-Bertrand fashion throughout the sample and the theory that U. S. Steel switched from 
Stackelberg leadership to NashB only in the 1930’s.  J tests indicate that both models increase the 
explanatory power of the other; this implies inconclusive results.   
 
 A comparison between the hypothesis with Nash-Bertrand behavior for all firms in all years and 
the sequence of U.S. Steel permanently switching from Stackelberg to Nash-B behavior in 1931 shows 
that the predicted value of the latter sequence adds to the explanatory power of the former, but the 
predicted value for Nash-B does not add power to the 1931 permanent switch model. 
 
 Comparisons 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Table 7 contrast the Nash-B hypothesis with a set of other 
hypothetical behavior sequences whereby U.S. Steel switched from Stackelberg to Nash-Bertrand 
behavior at different dates as posited by different theories of steel company behavior.  Two of these 
theories are the basing point pricing hypotheses whereby U.S. Steel switched to Nash-B behavior in 1924 
and 1948 respectively.  For the comparison between Nash-B and 1924 the results are inconclusive, but J 
tests do indicate that the 1948 sequence adds explanatory power to the Nash-B model without the Nash-
B model adding to the power of the 1948 change sequence. 
 
 Comparisons 7 and 8 indicate that there are no significant differences in explanatory power 
between the Nash-B sequence and first, the theory whereby U.S. Steel behavior changed in 1960 with the 
increase in imports, and second, the sequence with the change occurring in 1963 with the Kennedy 
intervention in steel pricing. 
 
 Table 8 compares the sequence with U.S. Steel permanently switching from Stackelberg to Nash-
B behavior in 1931 with six other behavioral sequences.  In comparison 1, the permanent 1931 change 
model is contrasted to the sequence with U.S. Steel acting as a Stackelberg firm throughout the sample.  
The J tests indicate that the 1931 change sequence is more likely with a t value of 40.372.  In comparison 
2, when the permanent 1931 sequence is compared with that of U.S. Steel switching to Nash-B from 
Stackelberg in the 1930s and returning in 1940, the permanent U.S. Steel change improves on the 
temporary change model, but the latter does not improve on the other. 
 
In comparison 3 where the 1931 permanent change model is compared to the 1924 basing point 
price model, the former adds to the explanatory power of the latter, but the 1924 model does not add to 
the 1930s permanent change model.     
 
When the permanent 1930s change model is compared to the 1948 basing point price model in 
comparison 4, neither model adds power to the other.  This result may arise from the correlation between 
the two sequences.  The 1930s model has only 18 observations (out of 459) different from 1948 basing 
point model. 
 
In the Table 8 comparisons 5 and 6, the 1930s permanent change model is compared to sequences 
whereby U. S. Steel switches to Nash-Bertrand behavior respectively in 1960 due to the increase in 
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 imports, and 1963 due to the Kennedy intervention.  J tests indicate that the 1930s sequence adds 
explanatory power to both the 1960s models, but in neither case does the reverse occur.  Appendix I shows 
the results of other sequence comparisons. 
 
Thus, the most likely sequences are those where U.S. Steel permanently went from a Stackelberg 




This paper uses the parameters from the BLP demand model to determine steel firm behavior in 
the sample period, 1920-1972.  It estimates the price-margin model under different assumptions about 
firm behavior.  In the two most likely sequences of events, U.S. Steel acted as a Stackelberg leader early 
in the period and followed a Nash-Bertrand strategy later in the sample.  These two most likely sequences 
disagree on the date of the change: one positing 1931 and the other, 1948. 
 
This paper’s project has succeeded in arriving at not unreasonable results.  The above findings that 
U.S. Steel switched from Stackelberg to Nash-B behavior in either 1931 or 1948 are consistent with the 
previous literature on steel firm behavior.  This indicates that the BLP approach has the potential for 
modeling and testing more complicated behavior patterns. 
 
Consequently, it is evident that reasonable BLP or similar models can be constructed from the data 
available on the steel industry.  The industry in this period had some quite good information but also some 
data problems.  Thus, there may be data limitations for which new solutions are needed.  Even with these 
limitations, the plausible results of this paper bode well for historians using similar data sets on other 
industries or markets.  Apparently, the BLP model is not only an effective way to portray contemporary 
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 Table 1.  The Breakdown of Sector Steel Usage by Percentage, 1926,  




Buyer Industry  1926  1935  1950  1965 
 
Steel Production (tons) 54,090,000 38,184,000 96,836,000 131,462,000 
 
Automobiles   14.5  25.0  21.7   26.5 
 
Construction   19.5  14.5  17.1   28.9 
 
Railroads   23.5    6.5    6.7     4.2 
 
Containers      4.0  11.5     8.9     7.3  
 
Machinery     4.0    4.0    8.0   15.8  
 
Exports     5.0    3.5    3.9     2.7 
 
Others    29.5  35.0  33.7   14.6 
 
Source:  Rogers (2009)  
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 Table 2.  The Market Share of the Eight Largest Steel Firms and the Competitive  
Fringe Including Imports for Selected Years in the Sample. 
 
 
Steel Firm/ Year* 1920      1930 1940  1950  1960  1970 
  
 
US Steel   33.15       25.67 23.29  21.71  16.23            13.78 
 
Bethlehem Steel    3.51        8.15 10.87  10.43    9.48   9.04 
 
Republic    1.69        3.59   6.21    5.90    4.58              4.32 
 
National Steel   NA**        1.34  NA**    3.21    3.42   4.33 
 
Jones & Laughlin   3.98         3.32   3.40    3.41    3.43   3.06 
 
Armco    0.66        1.20   2.13    2.73    2.95   3.47 
 
Youngstown Sheet  
  & Tube        1.88         2.49   2.91    2.85    2.48   2.26 
 
Inland Steel    1.38           2.11   2.95    2.53    3.04   3.10 
 
Fringe***  26.83       15.22 16.33  14.75  15.43            20.24 
 
Outside Good**** 26.92        36.91 31.93  32.46  38.95            36.41  
 
Source:  Rogers (2009) 
 
 *       The denominator in these market share figures in the total of the steel used in the United States 
which consists of the production of the “Big Eight”, the Fringe, and the Outside Good. 
 
 **     Data are not available for National Steel for some years.  For those years, its data are included in 
the fringe. 
 
***   This is the market share of the smaller American firms combined with imports. 
 
**** This is called the outside good which is an estimate of the total American use of steel accounted 
for by the steel used up by consumers but not replaced by new product. 
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 Table 3.  The Hypotheses on U.S. Steel Behavior to be Tested. 
  
            Years           Years 
Hypotheses on          U.S. Steel followed a          U.S. Steel followed a 
 U.S. Steel Behavior         Stackelberg Strategy         Nash-Bertrand Strategy     References 
 
Only Nash-Bertrand        0                                                    1920-1972 
 
Only Stackelberg        1920-1972            0            
 
Switch from             1920-1930, 1940-1972                 1931-1939          Stigler, 1965                                                       
Stackelberg to                 Gaskins, 1972        
Nash-Bertrand, 1931                                                                                         
and return                              
 
Permanent         1920-1930                                   1931-1972          Stigler, 1965         
Switch from                       Gaskins, 1972                                                        
Stackelberg to                
Nash-Bertrand, 1931                
 
Switch from              1920-1924                                    1925-1972          Carlton, 1983                                                      
Stackelberg to                
Nash-Bertrand, 1924                                          
on the Ban of  
Pittsburgh–Plus 
Pricing                      
 
Switch from                    1920-1948                                    1949-1972         Carlton, 1983                                                       
Stackelberg to                
Nash-Bertrand, 1948                                         
on the Ban of All Basing 
Point Pricing  
 
Switch from                        1920-1959                                   1960-1972                         Rippe , 1970                                                                 
Stackelberg to                Mancke, 1968       
Nash-Bertrand                                                                        
on the Increase in 
Imports, 1959         
 
Switch from                   1920-1962                                   1963-1972                               McConnell, 1963 
Stackelberg to           
Nash-Bertrand     
with the Kennedy  
Pricing Pressure 1963            
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Table 4.  The Product and Buyer Characteristic Variables. 
  
The Firm Characteristic Variables: 
  
Steel Price (pt )*=  deflated composite steel-price index compiled by American Iron and Steel Institute  (1910-1975). 
 
FLongjt =    wjh*PlantLong jh, where PlantLong jh equals the longitude of plant jh in firmj, and wjh equal  
the ratio of the steel capacity of plant jh to the capacity of firmj, j= 1, m firms, h = 1, kj plants,  
 
Flat jt =    wjh*PlantLat jh, where PlantLatjh equals the latitude of plant jh in firmj and  wjh equal the ratio of the steel 
capacity of plant jh to the capacity of firmj, j= 1,  m firms, h = 1, kj plants, and 
    
FDUM j = 1, if firm j (other than U.S. Steel) and zero otherwise.  These variables are also used in the Price 
 equation. 
 
Time  = a time counter valued at 1 in 1920 and rising  in yearly increments to 53 in  1972.  This variable is also used 
in the Price Equation. 
 
The Buyer Characteristic Variables: 
 
vipt =  the buyer interaction variable with Steel Price, derived by taking random sample values from a normal distribution 
with a mean 0 and a 95 per cent interval of -1 to 1.  It is multiplied by pt. 
 
vilongt=  the buyer interaction variable with FLong j, derived by taking random sample values from a normal distribution with 
a mean 0 and a 95 per cent interval of -1 to 1.  It is multiplied by FLongjt. 
 
vilatt= the buyer interaction variable with FLat j derived by taking random sample values from a normal distribution with a 
mean 0 and a 95 per cent interval of -1 to 1.  It is multiplied by FLatjt. 
 
The Supply Variables* 
 
qt  =  Firm production quantity in year t.  (Rogers 2009). 
 
PCt* =  Price Index for coal (U.S. Bureau of Mines 1960-73), 
 
PIRt*=  Price Index for iron ore (Iron Age 1916-75), 
 
PSSt*=  Price Index for steel scrap (Iron Age 1955-73),   
 
WAGEt*= Yearly Wage Income of steel production labor (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1947-73), and 
 
Decadem = Dummy Variable equaling one if the observation is in decade k and zero otherwise,  m = 
   1930s, 1940, 1950s,  and 1960-72. 
 
 
* These variables are set in 1972 dollars.  All the variables on this page are available for the years, 1920 to 1972.  The dates 
on the sources only indicate their publication year -- not the years for which the data were available.   
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 Table 5.   Estimates of the Parameters of the Demand Model for the American Steel  
Industry, 1920-1972. 
 
Dependent Variable:  ln (Sjt / S0t) = ujt , as shown in equation (8a) 
 
   Estimated  Standard 
Variable    Coefficients  Errors   t Values 
      
Means Intercept                 -0.1305          
 
Steel Price (pt)     -0.0149     0.0019     -7.989 ** 
 
FLong jt               -0.1601    0.0348    -4.600 ** 
 
Flat jt                     0.0129   0.0693      0.186 
 
FDUMBethehem      -1.7834      0.2155    -8.276** 
 
FDUMRepublic        -2.1369   0.1166   -18.335** 
 
FDUMNational      -2.6199   0.1300   -20.153** 
 
FDUMJones&Laughlin         -2.6679   0.1540   -17.322** 
 
FDUMArmco         -2.4770   0.1543   -16.056** 
 
FDUMYoungstown        -2.4601      0.0974   -25.267** 
 
FDUMInland          -1.9533   0.1719    -11.363** 
 
FDUMFringe           -0.3385   0.0897      -3.772** 
 




Steel Price (pt)     -0.0008   0.0015      -0.514 
 
FLong jt        0.0280   0.0414       0.676   
 
Flat jt          1.3129   0.1169   -11.226** 
 
Data sample 1920-1972,  Number of  Observations 459 
 
Residual standard error: 0.3992 on 446 degrees of freedom 
Wald test:   223.3 on 12 and 446 degrees of freedom,  probability value: less than 2.2e-16  
 
** Significance level  0.01 
*   Significance level  0.05  
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 Table 6.  Estimates of the Parameters of the Price Model for the American Steel  
Industry, 1920-1972, under Different Assumptions about Firm Behavior. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  [pt -1*MARGjhk].  The margin is subtracted from price, as shown in equation (8b). 
     
       U. S. Steel Switching from   
 Nash-Bertrand   Stackelberg to Nash-Bertrand 
 Model     in 1930 Model    
Variable  Coefficients+    Coefficients+  
      
Intercept     -0.8480      -68.5100  
 
Steel Quantity (qjt)    0.0014     -0.000003 
   (1.801)    (-0.003) 
 
Time    2.1770     2.5400 
   (6.724)**    (7.140)** 
 
Price of Coal    0.8687      0.6617 
   (3.673 )**     (2.545)**   
                 
Price of Iron Ore    5.2570       4.8560 
   (8.700)**    (7.313)** 
  
Price of Scrap Steel   0.0337     0.1105 
   (0.410)     (1.225) 
 
Wage     0.0027    0.0030 
 (1.754)*      (1.757)* 
 
 
t Values are in parentheses below the coefficients. 
 
Adjusted R2   0.8946    0.8879  
Wald test:     223.3      202.5 
Probability Value:   <  2.2e-16    <  2.2e-16     
 
** Significance level 0.01 
*   Significance level 0.05  
 
+ The sample in this case is a panel consisting nine steel firms or groups for each year in series of 53 years.  The Panel 
method used is the fixed effects method whereby I use dummy variables for each firm in the sample (except for U.S. Steel 
which is the base) and for each decade in the time series part of the sample (except for the 1920s period which is the base).  
The results for panel variables (for decades and firms) are not displayed. 
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 Table 7.  Comparisons of Some Different Firm Behavior Regimes by J Tests 
with Model 1 Being Nash-B with Nash-B Fringe 
 
              J test for Model 1       J test for Model 2 
Comparison      Model 1                   Model 2                    Explaining Model 2    Explaining Model 1   Conclusion 
1                         Nash-B             Nash-B                                
                           with Nash-B           Competitive                  -0.188                            0.187                      Inconclusive 
                           Fringe                     Fringe 
 
2                         Nash-B              U. S. Steel 
                           with Nash-B            Stackelberg,                  1.758                           -1.332                      Inconclusive 
             Fringe                     All Sample     
 
3                         Nash-B              U. S. Steel 
                           with Nash-B            Switching from            -3.482**                        5.137**                  Inconclusive 
              Fringe                     Stackelberg to                   
                                                            Nash-B in 1931 
                                                            And Return   
 
4                        Nash-B             U. S. Steel 
                          with Nash-B             Switching from            -0.209                            9.728**                  Model 2 stronger 
                          Fringe                       Permanently 
                                                            Stackelberg to 
                                   Nash-B in 1931                                                   
 
5                        Nash-B              Basing point Pricing 
                          with Nash-B             U. S. Steel              -3.857**                      10.460**              Inconclusive                          
                          Fringe                       Permanently 
  Switching from              
                                                            Stackelberg to 
                                   Nash-B in 1924                                                                       
 
6                      Nash-B              Basing point Pricing 
                        with Nash-B               U. S. Steel              -1.702                            6.193**          Model 2 stronger 
                        Fringe                         Permanently 
                                                            Switching from 
                                                            Stackelberg to 
                                   Nash-B in 1948 
     
7                     Nash-B               Imports 
                       with Nash-B                 U. S. Steel                0.502                          -0.662          Inconclusive 
                       Fringe                           Permanently                         
                                                             Switching from              
                                                             Stackelberg to 
                                    Nash-B in 1960                                                   
     
 8                    Nash-B               Kennedy Intervention  
                       with Nash-B                 U. S. Steel                0.524                          -0.574          Inconclusive                         
                       Fringe                           Permanently 
                                                             Switching from              
                                                             Stackelberg to 
                                    Nash-B in 1963 
                    
** Significance level 0.01 and * Significance level 0.05 
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 Table 8.  Comparisons of Some Different Firm Behavior Regimes by J Tests with Model 1 Being  
U. S. Permanently Switching from Stackelberg to Nash-B in 1931. 
 
                   J test                  J test 
                  for Model 1      for Model 2 
                                                                                                  Explaining        Explaining 
Comparison      Model 1                    Model 2                        Model 2            Model 1             Conclusion 
     
  1                       U. S. Steel            U. S. Steel                                 
                           Permanently    Stackelberg                 40.372**            -0.119                Model 1 stronger    
                           Switching from       All Sample 
                           Stackelberg to                
                           Nash-B in 1931             
     
  2                       U. S. Steel             U. S. Steel                                 
                           Permanently    Switching from           11.730**           -0.167                 Model 1 stronger    
                           Switching from        Stackelberg to 
                           Stackelberg to         Nash-B in 1931               
                          Nash-B in 1931         and Returning 
                                                in 1940 
     
  3                      U. S. Steel             Basing point Pricing           
                          Permanently    U. S. Steel                     3.079**            -0.178                 Model 1 stronger    
                          Switching from        Permanently 
                          Stackelberg to          Switching from               
                          Nash-B in 1931         Stackelberg to 
                                                Nash-B in 1924 
 
 4                       U. S. Steel              Basing point Pricing                   
                          Permanently     U. S. Steel                    0.289                 0.023                 Inconclusive 
                          Switching from         Permanently 
                          Stackelberg to           Switching from               
                          Nash-B in 1931          Stackelberg to 
                                                 Nash-B in 1948                                                 
                      
 
 5                       U. S. Steel               Imports                      3.562**             -0.110                Model 1 stronger    
                          Permanently      U. S. Steel 
                          Switching from          Permanently 
                          Stackelberg to            Switching from               
                          Nash-B in 1931          Stackelberg to 
                                                 Nash-B in 1960                             
 
 6                       U. S. Steel                   Kennedy                    5.035**             -0.127               Model 1 stronger 
                          Permanently               Intervention 
                          Switching from          U. S. Steel 
                          Stackelberg to            Permanently   
                          Nash-B in 1931          Switching from             
                                                 Stackelberg to               
                                                              Nash-B in 1960 
 
** Significance level 0.01  and * Significance level 0.05 
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 Appendix I.  Comparisons of Some Different Firm Behavior Regimes by J Tests 
 
 
Model /Model             
        J Test for Difference between the Below Regime+ 
          
              U. S. Steel       U. S. Steel  
            Nash-B          Switching from        Switching from 
              with Nash-B     Stackelberg to        Stackelberg to 
            Fringe          Nash-B and return    Nash B Permanently 
 
Nash-B                                           -3.482**           9.728**   
with Nash-B Fringe                                                               5.137**  -0.209 
 
Nash-B -0.188    
Competitive Fringe  0.187 
         
U. S. Steel     1.758                           -10.51**   40.372** 
Stackelberg,  All Sample   -1.332                             11.91**  -0.119  
  
U. S. Steel Switching    5.137**                       11.730**    
from  Stackelberg   -3.482**                           -0.167 
and Returning in 1941 
 
U. S. Steel Switching from  -0.209                              -0.167 
Stackelberg to Nash-B    9.728**                         11.730** 
Permanently in 1931 
 
Basing Point Pricing  -3.857**                         -2.282*   3.079** 
U. S. Steel Switching    10.460**                          8.831**  -0.178 
from Stackelberg to Nash-B 
Permanently in 1924 
 
Basing Point Pricing    1.702                               2.561*   0.283 
U. S. Steel Switching       6.193**                         16.280**   0.023 
from Stackelberg to Nash-B 
Permanently in 1948 
        
U. S. Steel Switching     0.502            -6.751**               3.562** 
from Stackelberg to Nash-B    -0.667  15.280**              -0.110 
 Permanently in 1960 
 
Basing Point Pricing   0.524           -8.045**                5.035** 
U. S. Steel Switching       -0.574   14.480**               -0.127 
from Stackelberg to Nash-B   
Permanently in 1963 
 
+ The upper J test statistics is the test for the hypothesis that the model at the top of the page adds explanatory 
power to the model on the left-hand side. 
 
** Significance level  0.01   
*   Significance level  0.01 
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